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AMERICA'S "OTHER CONSTITUTIONS":
THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR
OUR LAW AND POLITICS

Sanford Levinson*
Robert F. Williams, The Law ofAmerican State Constitutions(Oxford U. Press 2009).
Pp. 433. $95.00.
What is the subject matter of "American constitutional law"? The standard answer,
alas, is the United States Constitution. "When Americans speak of 'constitutional law,"'
James Gardner has written, "they invariably mean the U.S. Constitution and the
substantial body of federal judicial decisions construing it."I To put it mildly, this is a
mistake, in every conceivable way. Almost all of the 300+ million residents of the
United States the most important exceptions are those who reside in the District of
Columbia - live under two constitutions, one the United States Constitution, the other the
constitution of the state in which that person happens to live. 2 Indeed, things can become
even more complex for certain enrolled members of American Indian tribes who may
also be subject to tribal constitutions. 3
In a 1988 poll, however, as Robert Williams tells us on the opening page of his
excellent new book on American state constitutions, "52 percent of the respondents did
not know that their state had its own constitution." 4 More dismaying, perhaps, is a report
issued the following year by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas Law
School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to Mark Graber for his
comments on an earlier draft of this review.
1. James A. Gardner, InterpretingState Constitutions: A Jurisprudenceof Function in a FederalSystem,

23 (U. Chi. Press 2005). Even worse, as former Oregon state justice Hans Linde also, of course, a
distinguished legal academic - has observed, "General constitutional law courses, which everyone takes, create
the impression that contemporary majority opinions and dissents in the United States Supreme Court exhaust
the terms as well as the agenda of constitutional litigation." Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not
Common Law: Comments on Gardner's FailedDiscourse, 24 Rutgers L.J. 927, 933 (1993). If I can ride one of

my own hobbyhorses, I note as well that by limiting "constitutional law" to what happens to be currently
litigated, those who teach such courses never both to inform their students by far the most important parts of
the Constitution, with regard to structuring our political order, are those that are never litigated. See, for an
elaboration of this argument, Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where The Constitution Goes
Wrong (And How We The People Can CorrectIt) (Oxford U. Press 2008).

2. Or, for that matter, consider "cosmopolitans," rootless or otherwise, like my wife and me, who split our
time between Texas and Massachusetts, not to mention the obvious fact that anyone who travels at all from one
state to another becomes at least temporarily subject to the constitution of the host state.
3. See the extensive listing of American tribal constitutions at The University of Oklahoma Law Center,
Constitutions,http://thorpe.ou.edu/const.html (last accessed Oct. 12, 2010).
4. Robert F. Williams, The Law ofAmerican State Constitutions 1 (Oxford U. Press 2009).
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that concluded that even "lawyers tended to be unaware of their state constitutions." 5
Judge Jeffrey Sutton compared such ignorant lawyers to basketball players, awarded two
shots after a foul, who choose to take only one shot. There are, of course, no such
ballplayers, but there are, says Sutton, all too many such lawyers who ignore the
potential relevance of their state constitutions in their exclusive reliance on federal
constitutional norms. By in effect giving up "the second free throw," they condemn their
clients to more losses than would otherwise be the case. 6 In the case of practicing
lawyers, Sutton is suggesting the de-facto presence of widespread malpractice. Let me
suggest that most professors of "constitutional law," especially those who fancy
themselves to be "constitutional theorists," should also be deemed as committing
malpractice of sorts insofar as they so resolutely ignore the importance of America's
"other constitutions" for the issues they purport to be interested in.7
One might easily explain (and justify) this disregard of state constitutions if it were
the case that the state governments established by them dealt with mere trivialities of no
interest to ordinary people (or even if they raised no interesting "interpretive issues" of
the kind that obsess legal academics). But either assertion is preposterous. As Daniel
Rodriguez has noted, "the basic range of policies and policy choices made by state and
local officials dwarf-indeed always have dwarfed-national political activity." 8 Many
state choices may be made "in the shadow" of the national Constitution 9 or of potentially
pre-emptive congressional statutes, but some significant number are made basically
autonomously and in light of state constitutional norms. One can debate whether the
United States has a robust "federalism," especially if we define that term by reference to

5. Id at 1-2.
6. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach-and Why Study-State Constitutional Law," 34 Okla. City U. L. Rev.

165, 166 (2009). 1 am grateful to Justin Driver for drawing this article to my attention.
7. Sutton, a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit who is also an adjunct
professor at Ohio State, describes state constitutional law as "an underdeveloped area of the law." Id. One
measure of this "underdevelopment" is the fact that of the twenty-four law schools that offered a course in
2007-2008 on "State Constitutional Law" (as distinguished from state-specific state constitutional law courses),
none was ranked that year in "the top fifteen law schools, as measured by U.S. News and World Report." Id at
166-167 (footnote omitted). I am happy to note for the record that my colleague Dan Rodriguez taught a course
on "state constitutional law" at the University of Texas Law School - tied for number 14 in the most recent US
News poll on academic reputation in the spring of 2010, but this only barely challenges Judge Sutton's
altogether accurate critique.
8. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Scope of Judicial Review, in New Frontiers In
State ConstitutionalLaw: Dual Enforcement of Norms (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., Oxford U. Press

forthcoming 2010). Consider, for starters, only the issues of zoning (and general land-use planning) and
property taxes, two issues guaranteed to roil any state or local polity. Similarly, a recent "op-ed" in the New
York Times by former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who had been both an elected official and a state judge
within Arizona, states that "[s]tate courts resolve the most important legal matters in our lives, including child
custody cases, settlement of estates, business-contract disputes, traffic offenses, drunken-driving charges, most
criminal offenses, and most foreclosures." She presents this in the context of a column condemning the way
that most states currently elect their judges. Sandra Day O'Connor, Take Justice Offthe Ballot, N.Y. Times D9
(May 23, 2010). Obviously, most of the examples chosen by O'Connor rarely involve constitutional issues as
such, though states often have state-constitutionally-mandated norms of criminal procedure that differ in
important ways from national norms as interpreted by the Supreme Court. For example, eleven states extend
"constitutional protection to privacy, which has been interpreted as affording a broader substantive right than
the Fourth Amendment's search-and-seizure claims." See Helen Hershkoff, State Common Law and the Dual
Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, in New Frontiers In State Constitutional Law (Oxford U. Press

forthcoming 2010).
9. See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Leg. Stud. 225 (1982).
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constitutionally entrenched autonomy of sub-national units with regard to matters of
significant public importance. 10 There can, however, be little doubt that many issues of
great public importance are decided within the states and that state constitutions are
frequently thought to be relevant to such decisions. This is most obviously true with
regard to decisions by state courts, 11 but one should also be aware of the consequences
of the structures established by state constitutions for the actualities of governance
Think only of California's almost spectacularly dysfunctional constitution.12 Thus
the distinguished magazine The Economist, in a 2009 article entitled "The ungovernable
state," noted that "California has a unique combination of features which, individually,
are shared by other states but collectively cause dysfunction." The first is "the
requirement that any budget pass both houses of the legislature with a two-thirds
majority," a requirement found in the constitutions of two other states, Rhode Island and
Arkansas. "But California, where taxation and budgets are determined separately, also
requires two-thirds majorities for any tax increase. Twelve other states demand this.
Only California, however, has both requirements."1 3 And, of course, California also
allows constitutional amendment through initiative and referendum, which has included,
in recent years, adoption of amendments mandating certain expensive state policies.14
Perhaps Congress could, through its various powers especially as interpreted by the postNew Deal Court, displace all such decisions through federal legislation. But we know
both that Congress has not done so and is quite unlikely to do so in any foreseeable
future.
Williams also amply demonstrates that state constitutions present interpretive
dilemmas that are no less interesting than those generated by the national constitution.
Sometimes these dilemmas involve features that are unique to state constitutions, such as
the "single subject" rule that many constitutions impose on state legislatures when

10. See e.g. Malcolm M. Feely & Edward Rubins, Federalism:PoliticalIdentity and Tragic Compromise 7

(U. Mich. Press 2008), for an argument that American federalism is both very weak and, to the extent it exists
at all, basically unfortunate (as distinguished from "decentralization," (at p. 20) which is a non-constitutionallydemanded political choice with regard to the creation or implementation of given public policies).
11. Recall in this context Alexis de Tocqueville famous remark that "[s]carcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to
borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings." Alexis
De Tocqueville, 1 Democracy In America 1, Ch.16 (Am. Stud. Programs 1835) (available at
http://xroads.virginia.edu/-Hyper/DETOC/1 chl6.htm.). Mark Graber has demonstrated that this is simply
false with regard to the federal judiciary at the time Tocqueville was writing (or thereafter, for that matter). See
Mark Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's Thesis Revisited, 21 Const.

Commentary 485 (2004). It may, however, have considerable more validity with regard to state courts and
constitutions. Thus Jed Handleman Shugerman, in his recent article on the rise of the elected judiciary in
antebellum America states, has shown that one consequence of moving to an elected judiciary was the
increased frequency of judicial review of purported legislative overreaching, which, according to Shugerman,
was the point of placing the appointment power in the hands of the public rather than leaving it in the hands of
elected legislators. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and

JudicialReview, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1063, 1115 ("A Boom in Judicial Review"), 1147 ("Appendix B.1: State
Supreme Court Cases Declaring State Laws Unconstitutional") (2010).
12. See e.g. ConstitutionalReform in California:Making State Government More Effective and Responsive

(Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., Inst. Govtl. Stud. Press 1995).
13. California: The

Ungovernable State, The

Economist

33

(May

16-22,

2009)

(available at

http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/PrinterFriendly.cfin?story_id=13649050).
14. See Bruce E. Cain et al,,ConstitutionalChange: Is it Too Easy to Amend Our State Constitution, in Cain

& Noll, supra n. 12, at 288-289.
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passing legislationl5 or the California distinction between "amendment," open to
initiative and referendum, and "revision," which requires legislative participation. 16 But
there are also fascinating challenges posed by the presence of similar clauses,
occasionally in the very same language, designed to protect individual rights. Should
state courts necessarily follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court, or should
they feel free to offer more robust readings of certain clauses than those adopted by the
nine justices in Washington? Williams strongly endorses the independence of state courts
in several well-argued chapters that should interest any devotee of "constitutional
interpretation."17
Not only do our fifty state constitutions often present fascinating variations in
resolving basic issues of governance,18 but it is also the case, as Donald Lutz
demonstrated several years ago, that in many states one can do an archeology of
constitutions, inasmuch as the current constitution, like one of the ancient cities of Troy,
rests on top of a significantly greater number of discarded and supplanted predecessors.
If nineteen states have had only one constitution, twenty-two have had three or more, and
six have had more than half-a-dozen, led by Louisiana (11) and Georgia (10).19 There is
a treasure trove of material in front of our very eyes, if only we could be torn away from
our fixation on the United States Constitution, even as supplemented by glances at other
national constitutions.
Excellent books have recently been published (with more coming through the
pipeline) on state constitutionalism. Joining them is this magnum opus by Robert F.
Williams. By any measure Williams is, with his Rutgers colleague Alan Tarr,21 the
"dean" of American state constitutionalism. He has been publishing copiously on the
topic since 1973;22 not surprisingly, he is a long-time teacher of a course on state
constitutional law. It may help that he teaches in a state that not only got a new
constitution in 1948, but also has one of the most interesting (some would, no doubt, say
"activist") state supreme courts in the country.23 In any event, all of us have reason to be
15. See Williams supra n. 4, at 261-263.
16. Id at 403-404.
17.

See id. at 195-232.

18. See especially John Dinan, The American State ConstitutionalTradition (U. Press Kan. 2006).
19. Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment, in Responding to Imperfection: The
Theory and Practiceof ConstitutionalAmendment 237, 249 (Sanford Levinson ed., Princeton U. Press 1995).

The mean number of constitutions/state is 2.9. Id. It is, of course, telling that Lutz, like John Dinan and Alan
Tarr, is a political scientist. There have long been political scientists interested in the politics of state and local
government. Indeed, one of the best-known books in political science in the past sixty years is Robert Dahl's
seminal Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (Yale U. Press 1961). (elaboration of

politics in New Haven, Connecticut).
20. For already published books, see, e.g., the bibliographical essay in Williams, supra n. 5, at 411-415.
Forthcoming is State ConstitutionalLaw: Dual Enforcement of Norms, supra n. 8.
21. See G. Alan Tarr, UnderstandingState Constitutions (Princeton U. Press 1998).

22. See Rutgers Law, Directory, http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/bio/968 (last accessed Oct. 21, 2010).
23.

See e.g. Michael Paris, FramingEqual Opportunity: Law and the Politics of School Finance Reform 62

(Stanford U. Press 2010) (focusing in part on school finance cases in New Jersey between 1973-2009); Charles
M. Harr, Suburbs Under Siege: Race, Space, and Audacious Judges (Princeton U. Press 1996) (study of Mt.

Laurel litigation concerning land-use and low-income housing). I should also note that by far the most
luminous moment in my slender career as a practicing lawyer came in State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 633
(1980), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the New Jersey Constitution to protect my client,
Chris Schmid, against a trespassing charge filed by Princeton University triggered by his attempting to
distribute controversial political leaflets.
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grateful to Williams putting his almost unique bank of knowledge on the subject into a
very accessible work that should be on the shelves of every academic (and others) who
presumes to be interested in "constitutional law."
"This book," he writes, "is not intended to provide an exhaustive catalog of the
provisions in the 50 American state constitutions," nor, even more, does it "analyze all of
the judicial decisions and the interpretation techniques they reflect, expounding on the
meaning of the states' constitutional provisions." 24 Nor is it organized by narrow
substantive topic (such as, say, "education" or "land-use planning"). Instead, he offers
(and divides his book into sections devoted to):
[1] a selective, general survey of the origins, evolution, and functions of the state
constitutions;
[2] a comparative and illustrative analysis of the contents of the state constitutions;
[3] a detailed consideration of their rights provisions that operate simultaneously
with federal constitutional rights provisions;
[4]a review of state constitutional structure and distribution of power together with
considerations of the nature, powers, and interrelationships of each of the three
branches;
[5] examples of policy matters that have been inserted into state constitutions; and
[6] the processes of state constitutional amendment and revision.25
He rather modestly offers the book "as a reference tool" that "therefore need not be
read through from start to finish". 26 A reference book it certainly is, but it is just as
certainly not written in a deadly "encyclopedic" style, and my own interest was sustained
from beginning to end. Indeed, for reasons I will elaborate presently, I wish it were
longer.
Williams begins his historical section by asserting "[s]tate constitutions are sui
generis, differing from the federal Constitution in their origin, function, form, and
quality"27 Two state constitutions still in operation, though much amended, precede the
national Constitution, the Massachusetts Constituion of 1780 drafted by John Adams and
the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784.28 But, as noted earlier, many states, including
some quite "old" ones, have far "younger" constitutions; Georgia adopted its tenth
constitution only in 1983, while Virginia adopted its sixth constitution in 1971.29 This
ability of states not only to frequently amend, but also to out-and-out supplant their
existing constitutions is ample evidence that there is, perhaps fortunately, little or none of
the "veneration" applied to them as exists with regard to the United States
Constitution. 30 Given my own belief that the veneration directed toward the national
Constitution is grotesquely excessive and, indeed, an impediment to reforms necessary to
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Williams supra n. 5, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id at 20.
Lutz, supra n. 19, at 248.
Id.
See Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalFaith 9 (Princeton U. Press 1988).
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give us a political system suitable for our 21st century realities,31 it may well be an
advantage that state constitutions, when they are thought of at all, are treated often with a
ruthless instrumentality. How well, that is, are a state's citizens served by the existing
constitution? If the answer is "not very well," then there is a manifest willingness to
amend it and, with some regularity, even to replace it. As John Dinan notes in his own
valuable book, there have been more than 225 state constitutional conventions in our 220
year history, not least because fourteen states include within their constitutions
provisions whereby the state electorate is given recurrent opportunity to call such
conventions.32 Thus New Hampshire might still be operating under the aegis of its 1784
constitution (itself a replacement for the earlier 1776 exemplar), but it leads all other
states in the number of conventions (17), the most recent having occurred in 1984.33
Williams notes that "[t]he central controversies of the first state constitutions had
little to do with rights. The focus was on how the new state governments would be
structured and which groups in society would have the dominant policy-making role
under the new governments" 34 But one might say, of course, that the same thing was true
of the Philadelphia convention that drafted the United States Constitution, and for
extremely good reason. Whether or not one agrees completely with James Madison's
dismissal of rights provisions as "parchment barriers" 3 5 that would prove least effective
"on those occasions when its control is most needed,"36 it is hard to gainsay that
structures almost certainly explain far more about the actualities of American politics
i.e., those policies that are adopted, rejected, or, indeed, are never seriously considered
than do the rights provisions. Moreover, and just as importantly, most of the arguments
for and against particular structures were made by reference to their ostensible ability to
protect rights. (One's view about the presidential or gubernatorial veto power, for
example, is likely to be linked with the trust one has in legislatures and the likelihood
one assigns to the probability that the separately elected executive will protect rather than
be indifferent to the rights of the people.) And, as a matter of fact, early state
constitutions especially were far more attentive to bills of rights something notably
lacking in the 1787 Constitution precisely because the fundamental theory of state
government is that it possessed plenary powers, making it vitally important to specify
what state government could not do, as against the mantra of the United States
Constitution, that it constituted only a "limited government of assigned powers."3 7
31. See Levinson, supra n. 1, at 16-20.
32. Dinan, supra, n. 18, at 11.
33. Id. at 8. Williams also offers a valuable discussion of 20th century state conventions in his final chapter.
Williams supra n. 5, at 364-378.
34. Id. at 41.

35. See e.g. James Madison, FederalistNo. 48, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, & John Jay, The
FederalistPapers279 (ABA 2009).

36. See Ltr. From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) (available at
http://www.constitution.org/jm /17881017 bor.htm.).
37. James Madison pointed to this essential difference between state and national constitutions in his
speech to the House of Representatives explaining his view that Congress had no power to charter the Bank of
the United States. He
took notice of the peculiar manner in which the federal government is limited. It is not a general
grant, out of which particular powers are excepted - it is a grant of particular powers only, leaving
the general mass in other hands. So it had been understood by its friends and its foes, and so it was
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However interesting rights provisions in state constitutions might be, it is a shame,
in some ways, that Williams shares so much of the American law professors' fascination
with rights and their constitutional protections. Thus he devotes more space 3 8 to "Rights
Guarantees Under State Constitutions: The New Judicial Federalism" than to "Structure
of State Government." 3 9 Although he mentions the important reality, for example, that
"[m]ost states ... now have a plural, fragmented, or 'unbundled' 4 0 executive, with a
variety of elected state constitutional executive officers, each with their own statewide
constituency," 4 1 he pays less attention to this than the subject warrants, especially given
the insistence, thanks to certain overreadings of Hamilton's statements about executive
power in The Federalist,that a "unitary executive" is the only sensible way to organize
that branch of government (assuming, of course, that one rejects a parliamentary form of
government).42 It is simply and demonstrably utterly false to say that this captures any
"American view" of executive branch organization, since it has so overwhelmingly been
rejected by the drafters of state constitutions from the earliest period of constitution
drafting.
Similarly, I wish that Williams, when discussing the organization of the legislature,
had spent some time on Nebraska's so far sole venture into unicameralism (even though
former Minnesota Gov. Jesse Venture altogether correctly suggested that Minnesota
emulate Nebraska). Given the transformation in state apportionment generated by
Reynolds v. Sims, 43 it is difficult indeed to figure out why most states are benefitted by
the expense of paying for an extra house of the legislature. This is especially true in a
,separation of powers" system in which the governor is assigned, as is true now in all the
American states, a veto power that, as Williams well recognizes, is often substantially
greater than that enjoyed by the United States President. 4 4 The veto power creates a defacto tricameralsystem, and one must ask if states are well served by the creation of so

to be interpreted .
James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (Washington D.C., Feb. 2, 1791), in James Madison:,

Writings 482 (Jack Rakove ed., Lib. of Am. 1999) (emphasis added). See also John Marshall's opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).

This Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle that it can
exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have required to be enforced by
all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it
necessary to urge. That principle is now universally admitted.
What is "peculiar about the national constitution is precisely this emphasis on assigned powers, in contrast
with state governments that are presumed to have unlimited power unless their own constitutions explicitly
limit it.
38. Williams, supra n. 5, at 113-232.
39. Id. at 235-310.
40. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersten, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1385
(2008). See also Jacob Gersten, Unbundled Powers, 96 Va. L. Rev. 301 (2010); William P. Marshall, Break Up
the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L.J.

2446 (2006).
41. Williams, supra n. 5, at 303.
42. See, for the most enthusiastic expression of this argument, Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo,
The Unitary Executive: PresidentialPower From Washington to Bush (Yale U. Press 2008).

43. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964).
44. See Williams, supra n. 4, at 306-309; Dinan, supra n. 18, at 99-123.
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many veto points, especially when one realizes that all bicameral states emulate the
national government in giving each house of their legislature an absolute veto power
over legislation passed by the other house.
This is not to say, of course, that rights issues do not offer a host of important
issues that Williams consistently illuminates. As already suggested, an especially
interesting issue for constitutional interpretation buffs is the relationship between state
and national constitutional norms. After all, the "new judicial federalism" that Williams
alludes to in the title of the longest section of his book, was substantially sparked by a
1977 article by Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan in the HarvardLaw Review
that called on lawyers to recognize the relevance of state constitutions in protecting
individual rights.45 By 1986, Brennan would say that "[r]ediscovery by state supreme
courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by their state
constitutions ... is probably the most important development in constitutional
46
jurisprudence in our times."
One might doubt the accuracy of Brennan's assertion, 4 7 but there can be no doubt
that a number of state courts exhibited exceptional vigor in interpreting state
constitutions in a variety of areas. One area may indeed involve "overlapping" rights,
such as freedom of speech, criminal procedure, or, as we have seen especially in recent
years, the meaning of state "equal rights" provisions with regard to same-sex marriage. 4 8
But, even with regard to rights, Williams might have spent more pages on certain
important textual differences between the national and state constitutions. As already
noted, the United States Constitution left Philadelphia without an explicit bill of rights,
and those rights that were almost immediately added were "negative rights" dealing with
personal liberties that could be summarized, in important aspects, as instantiating "the
right to be left alone," described by Justice Brandeis as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."4 9 Many contemporary debates,
however, both at home and abroad, concern demands by the citizenry to certain kinds of
affirmative protections by the state against the vicissitudes of fate, what has come to be
called the "welfare state."
Although Frank Michelman (Brennan's former law clerk) famously provided a
way to "protect the poor through the Fourteenth Amendment," 50 any such interpretation
of the United States Constitution, as every American law student knows, was rejected by
45.

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.

489, 489 (1977).
46. Williams, supra n. 5, at 113 (quoting Natl. L.J. S1 (Sept. 29, 1988), as quoted in G. Alan Tarr,
UnderstandingState Constitutions 165 (Princeton U. Press 1998)).
47. See G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1097, 10981099 (1997); Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice 11-13 (Greenwood Press 1991) (both

suggesting that state courts rarely decided criminal cases on independent state grounds). One reason for this, as
Williams noted, is that it was often easier for state judges finding in behalf of a criminal defendant to, in effect,
blame the federal judges who had read the U.S. Constitution to protect their rights rather than to take the
responsibility themselves of offering an inevitably controversial reading of the state constitution. See Williams,
supra n. 4, at 231.
48. See e.g. Neal Devins, Same Sex Marriageand the New Judicial Federalism: Why State Courts Should
Not ConsiderOut-of-State Backlash, in Gardner & Rossi, supra n. 8.

49. Olmstead v. US., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
50. See Frank 1. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969).
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a majority of the Supreme Court in the early 1970s. Best known is probably the 1973
case that rejected federal oversight of educational expenditures. 5 1 But here, especially,
one makes a profound error in confining one's understanding of American
constitutionalism to the national Constitution and its interpretation by the Supreme
Court. As Professor Hershkoff writes, "every state constitution in the United States
addresses social and economic concerns and provides the basis for a variety of positive
claims against the government. False. [M]ore than a dozen state constitutions provide
explicit protections for the poor." 5 2 Almost certainly the most important such right is
education. As Douglas Reed notes, the constitutions of "[fjorty-nine of fifty states have
an education clause that specifies some required level of public education; many, in fact,
declare public education to be a fundamental state right." 53
Perhaps it is not surprising to discover that the Montana Constitution of 1972
established as "the goal of the people to establish a system of education which will
develop the full educational potential of each person" and pronounced as well that
"[e]quality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state," with the
legislature being directed to "provide a basic system of free quality public elementary
and secondary schools." 54 But consider as well the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,
drafted by John Adams. After an encomium to the importance of a "diffused" "wisdom"
and "knowledge" being essential to preserving popular "rights and liberties," it goes on,
rather charmingly, to say that "it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all
future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the
sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public
schools and grammar schools in the towns . . ."55 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court used this language as the basis of a 1993 case56 requiring significant changes in
the way that the state financed its public schools.
Rodriguez in 1973 was thus scarcely the last word regarding litigation concerning
the adequacy of America's public school systems. Instead, such litigation was displaced
from the federal courts to state courts. 57 Since the 1973 defeat in the United States
Supreme Court by those seeking reform in the funding of public education, "school

51. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973). As Judge Sutton has written, "the
majority in Rodriguez tolerated the continuation of a funding system that allowed serious disparities in the
quality of the education a child received based solely on the wealth of the community in which he parents
happened to live or could afford to live." Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1963, 1971 (2008). See also Richard Schragger, San Antonio v.
Rodriguez and the Legal Geography of School Finance Reform, in Civil Rights Stories 85 (Myrian E. Gilles &
Risa L. Goluboff eds., Foundation Press 2008).
52. Hershkoff, supra n. 8, at 135.
53. Douglas Reed, On Equal Terms: The ConstitutionalPolitics of EducationalOpportunity 55 (Princeton
U. Press 2003).
54. Mont. Const. art. X, § 1 (available at http://www.montanahistory.net/state/constitutionl972X.htm.).
55. Mass. Const. Ch. V, §II (available athttp://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/Constitution.).
56. McDuffy v. Sec. Exec. Office Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 547-548 (Mass. 1993). The Court later withdrew
from the area in Hancock v. Commr. Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1155 (Mass. 2005).
57. As, indeed, had been suggested by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his anguished dissent in Rodriguez,
where he explicitly noted that "nothing in the Court's decision today should inhibit further review of state
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions." 411 U.S. 1, 133 n. 100 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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finance litigation has been sustained, widespread, and ongoing."58 By 2007, "lawsuits
challenging state school finance systems had reached the high courts" of 43 of the 50
American states. Plaintiffs (i.e., self-styled "reformers") "prevailed in court in twenty-six
states, and they have failed in seventeen." 59 As one might imagine, there might well be
different notions of what it means to have "prevailed," especially if one is interested in
translating judicial paragraphs into changes on the ground that truly affect the lives of
one's clients. But there can be almost no doubt that school financing practices have
changed in many states at least partly because of the willingness of state courts to offer
vigorous interpretations of their respective state constitutions. It is a shame that Williams
did not choose to say more about this important development in "judicial federalism,"
which, as a practical matter, is probably more important for many more people than are
differences between state and federal norms of criminal justice.
CONCLUSION
It should go without saying that anyone already interested in state constitutional
must (and undoubtedly will) read this book. But these readers do not need my review.
They are already well aware both of the importance of the subject and of Robert
Williams's mastery of it. So the real audience for this review is the far larger number of
people who are unaware of either. Not only will they learn a great deal, as I most
certainly did, but also, and more importantly, if they are teachers, they should be led to
revise their syllabi and to recognize that we are collectively disserving our students,
whether we imagine them as our colleagues in theoretical argument or as practitioners of
the law, if we fail to inform them of the potential relevance of state constitutions to their
practices. And, for that matter, if there are students reading this review, they should be
encouraged to ask about the potential relevance of their own state's constitution to the
issues being discussed in their traditional "constitutional law" classes. In any event,
Robert Williams has given all of us a marvelous resource to draw on, and we should take
advantage of it.

58. Michael Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity: Law and the Politics of School Finance Reform 46

(Stanford U. Press 2010).
59. Id. Judge Sutton, in his 2008 article, indicates that "as of June 2008, forty-five States have faced stateconstitutional challenges to their systems of funding public schools,' of which 28 were successful. Sutton,
supra n. 51, at 1974.
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